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31A-22-304 INSURANCE CODE 
policies. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Except ions to coverage requirements . 
Although Subsection (2)(d) (now (2Xa)(iv)) 
allows permissive users who are adequately 
covered by operator's insurance to be excluded 
from coverage in a policy issued to a motor 
vehicle business, in order to invoke this excep-
tion to the general requirement of Subsection 
(l)(b)(i) (now (lXa)(ii)(A)), the insurer must 
specifically incorporate the language of Subsec-
tion (2)(d) (now (2)(a)(iv)) in the insurance 
policy. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
Invalid policy. 
The reference in a policy's step-down clause 
to "the limits of the Financial Responsibility 
Law" violated § 31A-21-106, which prohibits 
incorporation of provisions not appearing in the 
contract or in attached documents. Cullum v. 
Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993). 
Release . 
Injured party who entered into a settlement 
agreement with his tort-feasor, whereby he 
released the tort-feasor from any and all known 
and unknown personal injury as well as prop-
erty damage arising from the auto accident, cut 
off his insurance company's subrogation rights, 
and by so doing was not entitled to further 
benefits from his insurance company under the 
no-fault coverage. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979) (decided under 
prior law). 
Step-down coverage. 
This section does not prohibit insurers from 
providing step-down coverage for permissive 
users, as long as the coverage satisfies the 
statutory minimums set forth in § 31A-22-304. 
Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922 
(Utah 1993). 
Cited in Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 
R2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Wagner v. Farm-
ers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. North-
western Nat'l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 
1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability insurance: when is vehicle 
in "dead storage," 48 A.L.R.4th 591. 
Automobile liability insurance policy flight 
from police exclusion: validity and effect, 49 
A.L.R.4th 325. 
What constitutes use of vehicle "in the auto-
mobile business" within exclusionary clause of 
liability policy, 56 A.L.R.4th 300. 
Validity and construction of automobile in-
surance provision or statute automatically ter-
minating coverage when insured obtains an-
other policy providing similar coverage, 61 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
What constitutes "motor vehicle" for pur-
poses of no-fault insurance, 73 A.L.R.4th 1053. 
Validity, construction, and application of pro-
vision in automobile liability policy excluding 
from coverage injury to, or death of, employee of 
insured, 43 A.L.R.5th 149. 
What constitutes use of automobile "to carry 
persons or property for fee" within exclusion of 
automobile insurance policy, 57 A.L.R.5th 591. 
31A-22-304, Motor vehicle liability policy minimum lim-
its. 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the 
insurer's liability under that coverage below the following: 
(1) (a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one 
person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (a), in the 
amount of $50,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of 
two or more persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any 
one accident; and 
(c) in the amount of $15,000 because of liability for injury to, or 
destruction of, property of others arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; or 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-305 
(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily injury to or 
the death of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, the property of 
others. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-304, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1992, ch. 132, § 2; 
1993, ch. 271, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ers of their vehicles. There is no expressed 
public policy that would require finding liabil-
Zjl.a, l*y °oC0l151. ^ ity based upon mere ownership of a vehicle. 
Liability of self-insurers.
 L a n e y H o e l l T ^ 6 6 3 R S upp . 370 (D. 
Step-down coverage.
 U t a h 1 9 g d d d d f o r m e r ^ 3 
Cited. 
Liability of county. Step-down coverage. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own Section 31A-22-303 does not prohibit insur-
vehicles operated by permissive users, under ers from providing step-down coverage for per-
former law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 missive users, as long as the coverage satisfies 
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). the statutory minimums set forth in this sec-
tion. Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 
Liability of self-insurers.
 9 2 2 (Utah 1993). 
Public policy as expressed in Utah law is tha t 
self-insurers must provide security for damages Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 
inflicted by themselves, and by permissive us- P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, parent rence within liability policy limiting insurer's 
or child of accident victim as within extended liability to a specified amount per accident or 
"per accident" rather than "per person" cover- occurrence, 64 A.L.R.4th 668. 
age of automobile liability policy, 46 A.L.R.4th Validity and operation of "step-down" provi-
735. sion of automobile liability policy reducing cov-
What constitutes single accident or occur- erage for permissive users, 29 A.L.R.5th 469. 
31A-22-305. Uninsured and under insured motorist cover-
age. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, 
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the 
policy or owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle7' includes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not 
covered under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing 
occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required 
by Section 31A-22-304; 
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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 184 
were properly set aside where trial court failed Time for a p p e a l . 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard from a default judgment in a city court ran from 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, the date of notice of entry of such judgment, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). rather than from the date of judgment. Buck-
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, ner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 288 R2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank & 
ground that their counsel had an already Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d). 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or Ci ted in Utah Sand & Gravel.Prods. Corp. v. 
motion days between time objection was filed Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277. 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. 
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham. Young L a w Review. — Reason- hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham Opening default or default judgment claimed 
v. Saw ay a, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. to have been obtained because of attorney's 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
265 et seq. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. Failure to give notice of application for de-
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to fault judgment where notice is required only by 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 custom, 28 A.L.R.Sd 1383. 
A.L.R.3d 1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.Sd Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 da}^s from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
185 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show- affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compi le r ' s Notes . -
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
- This rale is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Extension of time to submit. 
—Failure to submit. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—-Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
——Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Effect of denial. 
Evidence. 
—Admissions of plaintiff. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Unsupported motion. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Intent to remove trustee. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
—Wills. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
Vb. 
BURDENE SHORES and 
UNIOR SHORES, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT TO 
DISMISS DEFENDANT BURDENE 
SHORES' COUNTERCLAIM OF BAD 
FAITH 
Civil No. 040400497 
Honorable Derek Pullan 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Count II of Defendant 
Burdene Shores' counterclaim for bad faith against Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
with Mitchel T. Rice appearing for Plaintiff and C. Peter Whitmer appearing for Defendant 
Burdene Shores. 
, ,,. -t Court 
Fourtr? ' \ , . .vUtah 
of Uta.> - • v>- - ' " 
Staa]..#J - oeputy 
COPY 
After reading Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss, the Memoranda in Support thereof, 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition thereto, and after considerations of oral argument from 
both Counsel, the Court hereby orders and presents its findings and conclusions as follows: 
1. The Court finds that on September 9, 2003, Burdene Shores was involved in an 
automobile accident in which her husband, Unior Shores, was driving; Mrs. 
Shores allegedly sustained personal injuries in the collision. 
2. The Court finds that Mr. and Mrs. Shores are named insureds on an insurance 
policy issued by Plaintiff which provides liability coverage for the automobile that 
the Shores were riding in at the time of the accident. 
3. The Court finds that Mrs. Shores is suing her husband in a separate action for 
negligent driving in an effort to collect benefits from the Liberty Mutual insurance 
policy. 
4. The Court finds that Mrs. Shores is seeking recovery under the liability coverage 
of the insurance policy. 
5. The Court finds that the present action shares facts similar to those in Sperry v. 
Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999), and that this Utah Supreme Court case 
provides the rule of law in the instant matter. 
6. The Court finds that Mrs. Shores' right to recovery stems from the liability 
coverage extended to Mr. Shores under the insurance policy and not her own 
coverage. 
2 
7. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Mrs. Shores is properly considered a 
third-party to the insurance contract for purposes of this suit. 
8. The Court concludes that because Mrs. Shores is considered a third party to the 
insurance contract, there is no privity of contract between she and Liberty Mutual. 
As a result, Liberty Mutual owes no duty of good faith and fair dealing to Mrs. 
Shores. 
9. The Court concludes that because Liberty Mutual owes no duty of good faith and 
fair dealing to Mrs. Shores, she cannot bring an action for bad faith against 
Liberty Mutual. 
10. Based on all of the reasons cited above, and the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs 
Memoranda in Support of Motion to Dismiss, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss Count II of Defendant 
Burdene Shores' counterclaim for bad faith. The counterclaim for bad faith is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as to Defendant Burdene 
Shores. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I did cause a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND 
FINAL JUDGMENT TO DISMISS DEFENDANT BURDENE SHORES' BAD FAITH 
COUNTERCLAIM, to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this day of August, 
2004: 
C. Peter Whitmer 
P. O. Box 434 
Pleasant Grove UT. 84062 
Ronald Ady 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BURDENE SHORES and 
UNIOR SHORES, 
Defendant. 
UNIOR SHORES, 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE | 
COMPANY, 
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
ACTION, AND DENYING DEFENDANT 
BURDENE SHORES' RULE 56(f) 
MOTION 
Civil No. 050100099 
Honorable Derek Pullan 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
On December 10, 2004, this matter came on for hearing on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Declaratoiy Judgment Action of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action, with Mitchel T. Rice appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, C. Peter Wliitmer 
appearing as attorney for Defendant Burdene Shores, and Ronald Ady appearing as attorney for 
Defendant Unior Shores. 
Also before the Court is Defendant Burdene Shores' Rule 56(f) Motion to continue a 
decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment in order to conduct further discovery. This 
Motion was raised orally by Mrs. Shores' Counsel at the commencement of the hearing on 
December 10, 2004. 
After reading Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Memoranda in Support 
thereof, Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition thereto, and after consideration of Oral 
Arguments from all Counsel on both the Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion, 
the Court hereby Orders and presents its findings and conclusions as follows: 
1. The Court finds that on September 9, 2003, Burdene Shores was involved in an 
automobile accident in which her husband, Unior Shores, was driving the vehicle; 
Mrs. Shores allegedly sustained personal injuries in the collision. 
2. The Court finds that Mr. and Mrs. Shores were named insureds on an insurance 
policy issued by Plaintiff which provides liability coverage for the automobile that 
the Shores were riding in at the time of the accident. The policy number is A02-
268-209010-1037. The Liberty Mutual Policy includes bodily injury liability 
coverage of $100,000 each person and $300,000 per accident. 
S:\Shores v. Liberty Mutual\Order and Final Judg.wpd 1 
3. The Liberty Mutual Policy of Insurance also includes a "step-down" or "household 
exclusion" in an endorsement to the policy, Endorsement # PP 01 93 04 02. This 
provision states as follows: 
I. Part A - Liability Coverage 
Part A is amended as follows: 
B. The following exclusion is added: 
We do not provide Liability Coverage for any "insured" for "bodily 
injury" to you to the extent that the limits of liability for this 
coverage exceed the applicable minimum limits for liability specified 
by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 31A-22-3 04. The applicable 
minimum limits are: 
1. $65,000 for each accident, if the limit of liability for this 
coverage is a single limit that applies for each accident; or 
2. $25,000 for each person/$50,000 for each accident, if the 
limit of liability for this coverage is indicated as a split limit. 
4. The Court finds that Mrs. Shores, through her Counsel, has demanded that Liberty 
Mutual pay $100,000 in liability limits under the automobile policy as a result of the 
accident and her injuries. Liberty Mutual has denied Defendant's demand based on 
the Household Exclusion provision but has offered to pay $25,000 in exchange for a 
release. 
5. The Court finds that Mrs. Shores is suing her husband in a separate action for 
negligent driving in an effort to collect benefits under the liability coverage of the 
Liberty Mutual Policy of Insurance. 
S:\Shores v. Liberty Mutual\Order and Final Judg.wpd 3 
6. Liberty Mutual filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief asking the 
Court to declare that it is not liable to pay more than the statutory minimum of 
$25,000 pursuant to the Household Exclusion in the policy endorsement. 
7. With regard to the legal standards for deciding Plaintiffs Motion, the Court 
concludes that a Motion for Summary Judgment is appropriate when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. The Court further views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
8. The Court further concludes that, under Utah law, insurance policies are interpreted 
according to the rules governing ordinary contracts, and the terms of the contract are 
harmonized with the policy as a whole. Ambiguities in an insurance policy are 
construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. 
9. The Court further concludes that exclusions in insurance policies are accepted as 
long as they don't violate public policy or state statute. Insurers are permitted to 
exclude certain losses from coverage by using language which clearly and 
unmistakably communicates to the insured the circumstances under which coverage 
will not be provided. 
10. The Court finds that the issue presented by Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is whether an insurer may limit coverage for members of an insured 
household in an automobile policy of insurance under Utah law. The Court finds 
that this particular issue is unresolved under the current state of the law in Utah. 
A 
S \Shores v Liberty Mutual\Order and Finai Judg.wpd ~ 
11. In deciding the present Motions, the Court considers the following judicial history: 
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court decided Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 
P.2d 231 (Utah 1985), where the Court held that household exclusion clauses in 
automobile insurance policies are contrary to public policy and the no-fault statutes 
as to any amounts at or below the minimum benefits established under the No-Fault 
Insurance Act. In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987). Two of 
the five Judges deciding Mastbaum held that household exclusions in automobile 
insurance polices are valid in excess of the statutory mandated amounts. Judge 
Durham wrote a dissenting opinion in Mastbaum where she opined that the 
legislative history indicated that all household exclusions in automobile insurance 
policies were contrary to public policy. Judge Zimmerman and Judge Stewart 
joined in a concurring opinion where they decided that only household exclusions in 
automobile insurance policies written after 1986 would be contrary to public policy. 
In 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals in National Farmers Union Property and 
Casualty Company v. Moore, 882 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1994), upheld a household 
exclusion in a farmowners policy of insurance, and flirther stated that the concurring 
and dissenting opinions in Mastbaum were dicta. In July of 2004, the Utah 
Supreme Court decided Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, 96 P.3d 916 (Utah 2004). In that opinion, the Utah Supreme Court held 
as follows: 
S \Shores v Liberty MutuaAOrder and Final Judg vvpd 5 
[Exclusionary endorsements such as the "owned vehicle" 
exception at issue are not necessarily invalid. "Rather, 
contracting parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the 
minimum required limits, and [an] exclusion found in [a] 
contract [is] valid in relation to any coverage exceeding 
minimum amounts." [citations omitted]. As long as any 
exclusions are phrased in "language which clearly and 
unmistakable communicates to the insured the specific 
circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be 
provided," exclusions in insurance policies beyond the 
minimum coverage limits are allowed. Alfv. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993) (quotations 
omitted). 
Id. at 923-24. 
12. The Court concludes that Calhoun sets forth the general rule of law governing 
exclusions in automobile polices, and this District Court is bound to follow that rule 
of law. 
13. The Court finds that the Household Exclusion in the Liberty Mutual Policy of 
Insurance clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insureds the circumstances 
under which coverage will be limited under the policy. 
14. Based on all of the reasons cited above, and the reasons set forth in Plaintiff Liberty 
Mutual's Memoranda in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 
hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on its Amended Complaint 
for Declaratory Relief, and further dismisses the causes of action for declaratory 
relief alleged in Defendant Burdene Shores' and Defendant Unior Shores' 
Counterclaims against Plaintiff. 
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15. The Court therefore concludes that the Household Exclusion in the endorsement to 
Liberty Mutual's Policy of Insurance is a valid and enforceable provision limiting 
the liability coverage for Defendant Burdene Shores' claim to $25,000. 
16. The Court further disregards the Affidavit of Ryan Farnsworth for purposes of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court concludes that the issue 
presented by Plaintiffs Motion is a legal issue to be decided by the Court. The 
Court therefore orders that Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion for a continuance to 
conduct additional discovery is denied. 
, 2005. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 10f 2004) 
3 THE COURT: Be seated. We'll go on the record in the 
4 matter of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company vs. Burdene Shores 
5 and Unior Shores, case No. 040400497. Counsel, will you state 
6 your appearances, please. 
7 MR. RICE: Yes, your Honor, Mitch Rice for the 
8 plaintiff, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 MR. WHITMER: Peter Whitmer appearing for Burdene 
11 Shores. 
12 MR. ADY: Ronald Ady here for Unior Shores. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. We're here on — if 
14 I remember correctly, I have read your briefs — on Liberty 
15 Mutual's motion for summary judgment as to the dec action; is 
16 that correct? 
17 MR. RICE: That is correct, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: I have had an opportunity to read through 
19 all of your pleadings, follow it up with some research on 
20 cases. So I'll put to you, Mr. Rice. 
21 MR. RICE: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, if I 
22 might, before we begin the argument on this motion, I would 
23 request the Court allow a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f), 
24 to complete discovery and to take the deposition of Ryan 
25 Farnsworth in this case, an affidavit that's been supplied 
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1 only to me this week in Liberty Mutual's reply memoranda. 
2 THE COURT: Does this go to the marketing practices — 
3 MR. RICE: It goes to the marketing practices and 
4 conflicts with Burdene Shores' affidavit. 
5 THE COURT: If there are conflicts of genuine issues of 
6 fact, it will preclude summary judgment anyway, won't it? 
7 MR. RICE: Yes, it would, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: I'm going to take that under advisement, 
9 because I want to understand more about that. So why don't you 
10 address that as we go along. 
11 MR. RICE: Very good. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 MR. RICE: I should put the Court on notice as well, 
14 sir, that I filed a cross motion for summary judgment on behalf 
15 of my client today. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, I haven't — I haven't read that yet. 
17 MR. RICE: Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: Thanks. 
19 MR. RICE: Your Honor, I was — to give you — let me 
2 0 comment on those preliminary comments as well, with regard to 
21 Mr. Ady. We had an agreement early on when I — when I — 
22 Liberty filed its motion for summary judgment. Mr. Whither 
23 filed a memorandum in opposition. 
24 Mr. Ady called me and said, "I need a little bit more 
25 time to file my memo in opposition. I said, '"That's fine, but 
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1 I only want to — I only want to file one replyf and I'd like 
2 to do it to both to save expense and so forth." 
3 So I was waiting for that memo in opposition, and 
4 it did not come. Knowing that the hearing was going to be 
5 held today, I felt the need to go ahead and file the reply 
6 memorandum, which I did last Friday. It's only been today 
7 that Mr. Ady filed that memorandum in opposition; and he's 
8 captioned it as a motion for summary judgment. I'm sure it 
9 serves the same purpose. 
10 I have not had an opportunity to review that. I think 
11 it's late in the game. I think it ought not to be considered 
12 and ought to be stricken under the rules of procedure for how 
13 these things are handled. That's my position on that. 
14 With regard to the 56(f), I believe that that's — 
15 that the issues will be immaterial; that the motion should 
16 be granted, in any event. Even though there may be some 
17 disputes about the facts of the sale and the transaction, 
18 it's immaterial to the motion. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 0 MR. RICE: Would the Court want me to proceed? 
21 THE COURT: Let me just pose some questions to you 
22 off the bat. That is, we have the Call case. That's it. 
23 Farmer's Insurance vs. Call in December of x85. In that case 
24 the Supreme Court says if you have the household exclusion that 
25 makes your coverage below what the minimum no fault requirement 
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1 is under State law, that's a problem; it violates public policy 
2 and it's going to void it. 
3 The plaintiffs in that case then said, "Well, it 
4 should void the whole policy," because — raised the issue 
5 directly in this case. That the household exclusion should 
6 be void as a matter of public policy, even above statutory 
7 minimums. The Court said, "We're not going to go there. We're 
8 not going to answer that question." 
9 Two years later we have Nasbaum, which two justices 
10 say the household exclusion — "If you're excluding coverage 
11 above what the minimum State law requirement is, then that's 
12 okay. We can live with that." 
13 MR. RICE: Right, the majority holding. 
14 THE COURT: And well, you got the two — 
15 MR. RICE: No, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, to interrupt. Go 
16 ahead, Judge. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah, you have the two — 
18 MR. RICE: Carry on. 
19 THE COURT: — Justice Zimmerman says, "You know, 
2 0 in the absence of legislation, I agree with the two in the 
21 majority; but I'm persuaded by what Justice Durham has said; 
22 and I think that every household exclusion written after 1986 
23 should be void, based on what our legislative history is." 
24 Justice Stewart, I think, concurs with him. 
25 Is that the holding of this case, then? That after 
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1 1986, in the absence of the legislature doing something 
2 different, then household exclusions above the minimum 
3 requirement are void? 
4 MR. RICE: Your Honor, I appreciate you grasping that 
5 issue; and it's something that I've addressed in the reply 
6 memorandum. Let me apologize for filing a memorandum, an over-
7 length one, but I felt it necessary. 
8 This is an important issue, and — there were multiple 
9 issues; and I felt the need to file a 17-page reply memorandum. 
10 I filed a motion, ex parte one, for over-length. I discussed 
11 that at length. 
12 I feel that that is not the holding and binding 
13 precedent. My position on that is that first of all it's a 
14 plurality decision and it's in dicta. In fact, in the Moore 
15 case, which I believe was a x93 or ^94 Utah Supreme Court case, 
16 the Court said just that. They said, "Nasbaum is dicta. It's 
17 not binding precedent." 
18 THE COURT: What does Nasbaum stand for today? Is 
19 there a holding there that we can take to the bank at all? 
2 0 Or I mean, obviously the whole case is in dicta. They reached 
21 a decision. What would — could it stand for today? 
22 MR. RICE: Judge, I don't know that it has much value 
23 today. No. 1, it was decided quite some time ago. No. 2, the 
24 Judges were split. 
25 THE COURT: Is that where we are today? From 1987 
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25 
until the present, 
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is the automobile insurance household 
exception issue just not been touched for 1 
years? 
MR. 
point. 
THE 
MR. 
RICE: 
COURT, 
RICE: 
I think that it has not 
Okay. 
The arguments that I wi 
— No. 1, the minority decision in Nasbaum 
the personal 
the next almost 20 
been decided on 
11 make is that the 
was flawed; and that 
injury protection statute since Judge Durham made 
that decision has been amended. 
THE COURT I saw that, yeah. Where it says, "You 
can't use this statute to exclude coverage 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
RICE: 
COURT 
RICE: 
then went back and 
to apply all 
injury protec 
THE 
MR. 
That's correct. 
Okay. 
Our position on that is 
in other areas"? 
that the legislature 
said, "Wait a minute. We didn't want this 
over the place. We wanted it 
3tion. 
COURT 
RICE: 
Uh-huh. 
Since that time, if the 
felt that household exclusions in auto pol 
voided, couldnf t they have put that in the 
They've had nearly 
THE 
MR. 
COURT 
RICE: 
15 years to do that. 
And that's — 
And they have not done 
to apply to personal 
legislature really 
icies should be 
liability coverage? 
that. 
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1 THE COURT: And when we talk about the liability 
2 coverage, is that 303? 
3 MR. RICE: That's correct. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MR. RICE: That's correct. So the legislature came 
6 back and amended and put provision 2(b) in, which you just 
7 referred to. I think that changes the analysis. I think 
8 that the other things that have changed the analysis are the 
9 two Supreme Court decisions that have validated household 
10 exclusions in the non-auto context. 
11 THE COURT: What type of insurance was involved in 
12 those? 
13 MR. RICE: One of them was a — I believe a Farmer's 
14 policy, Farmer's liability policy; and the other one was a 
15 homeowner's p o l i c y . 
1 6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
17 MR. RICE: One was in the Allen case. The other was 
18 in the Moore case. Again, the Supreme Court in those has an 
19 opportunity to say, "Public policy reasons, those provisions 
2 0 are invalid.'7 Did not do that. Did not do that. The legislature 
21 has never at any point came out and said, "They're invalid." 
22 At no point has that happened. 
23 Judge Durham comes up with this — with this analysis, 
24 and I don't want to be critical of her. You know, it's 
25 somewhat of a reasoned analysis, but I believe that it's — 
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1 I believe that it's flawed. So we have those two Supreme Court 
2 decisions that say they're valid in the non-auto context. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. RICE: And then we have a whole litany of cases; 
5 and the most recent one is the Calhoun case. In that case, 
6 just last summer, July of x04, that policy provision included 
7 an own vehicle exclusion. That, again, is not a household 
8 exclusion, but what the Court said on page — your Honor, I'm 
9 sorry, I've got my West Law printout. I believe it's 923. 
10 THE COURT: Do you have a paragraph number with you? 
11 MR. RICE: Ten and eleven. 
12 THE COURT: Ten and eleven. 
13 MR. RICE: Pages 923 and 924. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. RICE: And I'd like to take a minute to read that. 
16 "Moreover, contrary to the Calhoun's assertions, exclusionary 
17 endorsements such as the own vehicle exception at issue are not 
18 necessarily invalid. Rather, contracting parties are free to 
19 limit coverage in excess of the minimum required limits, and 
2 0 an exclusion found in a contract is valid in relation to any 
21 coverage exceeding minimum amounts." I'm going to skip over 
22 those cites. 
23 THE COURT: Okay, let me just — 
24 MR. RICE: I'm sorry, were you with me? 
25 THE COURT: Yeah, I'm about halfway through. 
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Okay. 
"Contracting parties are free to limit 
of the minimum required limits, and an 
a contract is valid in relation to any 1 
minimum amounts." Your position is that's 
just a general principal at this point, a general rule of law? 
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11. The exclusion, though, was different. 
COURT : Is this the — this is where the son wasn't 
covered, right? 
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COURT 
RICE: 
COURT 
RICE: 
That's correct. The son drives his father's 
: Yeah. 
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And he wants to recover under his own 
his own policy says, "We'll, cover your insured 
COURT 
RICE: 
: Uh-huh, 
— "but not — " 
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1 THE COURT: Any another. 
2 MR. RICE: — "another vehicle." 
3 THE COURT: And he — there was a household exclusion 
4 in Dad's policy? 
5 MR. RICE: I don't believe there was a household 
6 exclusion. I don't — there was another exclusion in his 
7 policy. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. RICE: Let me just read the next sentence, because 
10 I think it's also of value. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. RICE: "As long as any exclusions are phrased in 
13 language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the 
14 insured the specific circumstances under which the expected 
15 coverage will not be provided, exclusions and insurance 
16 policies beyond the minimum coverage limits are allowed." 
17 Now, this Calhoun case cites to the Alf vs. State 
18 Farm case. That case also provides very strong language about 
19 exclusions being allowed, as long as they're clearly phrased. 
20 There's a host of other Utah cases that I've cited to. Not — 
21 I'm not talking about a dozen, but there's — 
22 THE COURT: No. 
23 MR. RICE: — there's a number of them. Now, you take 
24 those holdings, and then you look at — I'm certain this is 
25 what would happen. That our Court of Appeals or our Utah 
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1 Supreme Court would look at what's happening around the nation; 
2 and what's happening around the nation — and I've cited to 
3 many of those opinions — the majority of Courts are holding 
4 that as long as it's above minimum limits, you're free to 
5 contract; you're free to exclude. 
6 You asked earlier about legislative intent. 
7 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
8 MR. RICE: If you read the insurance code, the first 
9 — the seventh paragraph where it says, "The purpose of the 
10 insurance code —-n it says under subparagraph (7), "The purpose 
11 is to allow parties the freedom to contract." 
12 Now, the public policy, I would more than agree if 
13 it's below the statutory minimums, it's invalid. That's our 
14 public policy. That's what we're concerned about. These 
15 decisions from around the country, and the decisions of late 
16 that are similar in Utah hold that if it's above the minimum 
17 limits, you're free to contract. 
18 THE COURT: I do have a question about 303. In 2000, 
19 the legislature added subparagraph (7), I believe, (7)(a), (b) 
2 0 and (c) to that statute. So I think the current contract would 
21 be governed by that. Do you — I have a copy up here if you 
22 need. 
23 MR. RICE: Judge, I — your Honor, I apologize. I 
24 don't know if I have that. 
25 THE COURT: No, that's all right. Let me get one. 
-13-
1 MR. RICE: I knew that part of the discussion would be 
2 on 309f and not so much 303. 
3 THE COURT: Here you go. Subparagraph (7) of 303 
4 says, "A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage — " under 
5 subsection 302(1) -- "may specifically exclude from coverage 
6 a person who is a resident of the named insured's household; 
7 including a person who usually makes his home in the same 
8 household but temporarily lives elsewhere if — " then you have 
9 to do three things. 
10 Is what we're dealing with here an exclusion from 
11 coverage? If that's the case, do you have to have the written 
12 consent of Ms. Shores in order for this exclusion to be valid? 
13 MR. RICE: Your Honor, I believe this is something 
14 different. This is not liability coverage when you have an 
15 insured making a claim against another insured. This is 
16 whether you're going to provide insurance at all to a member 
17 of the household. In fact, that was I think the father's 
18 situation in the Calhoun case. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, so — yeah, and I think Calhoun does 
2 0 interpret the statute. So what you would say is subparagraph 
21 (7) relates to whether we're going to provide coverage at all 
22 to somebody? 
23 MR. RICE: Right. 
24 THE COURT: Not what happens — 
25 MR. RICE: That's what happened in Calhoun. In Calhoun 
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1 the boy had a poor driving record, and the parents didn' t want 
2 to insure him or pay for him — 
3 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
4 MR. RICE: — and so this is the context they went 
5 into. Under this statute, "We can exclude him. He can get 
6 his own insurance. We have ours." That's something entirely 
7 different from if Mother and Father are in a car and they're in 
8 an accident --
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
10 MR. RICE: — Mother or Father is hurt, bringing an 
11 action against the driver, the negligent party. 
12 THE COURT: Maybe it could have been more artfully 
13 worded, but it seems to me if I were read this just like it 
14 says, if you're going to exclude a person from coverage — 
15 which the insurance contract seems to read that way in some 
16 ways, because it's 100,000 per person or 300,000 per accident. 
17 Then you go to the endorsement, and it says, "The following are 
18 excluded from coverage --" or "exclusions." Then it lists the 
19 insure. 
2 0 So did the legislature intend by this statute to say, 
21 "Look, if you're going to be excluding people from coverage, 
22 then you've got to get their written consent of people in the 
23 household"? 
24 MR. RICE: Again, Judge, I think that this applies to 
25 something different, a different scenario. We're talking about 
-15-
1 if you've got a poor driver in the home — 
2 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
3 MR. RICE: — and you want to do something about that 
4 so that it doesn't affect your rate — because typically under 
5 insurance, everybody in the home's included. 
6 THE COURT: Right. 
7 MR. RICE: That's just the way it's written. So the 
8 insurance company gets the names of everybody and finds that 
9 out and then set rates based on this. This gives people an 
10 out. 
11 THE COURT: And so you — again, you would have me 
12 interpret "exclude from coverage" meaning if you're going to 
13 not cover somebody at all --
14 MR. RICE: Right. 
15 THE COURT: — in the household, then you've got to do 
16 these things. Place people on notice. Essentially get their 
17 written consent that Johnny's not covered at all, but if you're 
18 offering insurance up to minimums for a person — if a person 
19 in the household is being offered insurance coverage of some 
2 0 kind under the policy, then subparagraph (7) does not apply. 
21 MR. RICE: It's a different — it's a different 
22 scenario. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. RICE: There's a lot of exclusions in a policy. 
25 THE COURT: Yeah. 
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1 MR. RICE: Many of them, and we don't require signing 
2 off on those. Again, you go back to those cases that say, 
3 "Parties are free to contract with your exclusions." That 
4 doesn't mean that the other side has to sign anything. They 
5 have to receive the policy. 
6 THE COURT: Those are all my questions. 
7 MR. RICE: Okay. Your Honor, I am not going to talk 
8 any further. I have laid out my arguments in my reply and memo 
9 in support; and if those are the Court's probative questions, 
10 I'll at this point conclude this part of my remarks. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Rice. 
12 Mr. Whitmer. 
13 MR. WHITMER: Thank you, your Honor. Before proceeding 
14 with my argument, I would encourage the Court to read 303(7) 
15 exclusion, as you have pointed out, as applying to this case, 
16 because I believe it does apply specifically to this case. 
17 Plaintiff's Counsel has specifically referred to 
18 the Calhoun case; and the Calhoun case was interpreting this 
19 particular statutory provision which allowed exclusions. The 
20 case before this Court today is not in point at all, because 
21 it's not with regard to a statutory exclusion. It's regard to 
22 an exclusion from coverage. 
23 Now, proceeding with my general argument, if the Court 
24 doesn't have particular questions — 
25 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
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1 MR. WHITMER: — the first issue I'd like to bring up 
2 again is the state of discovery in this case. By what I will 
3 term "obstruction tactics," the plaintiff's Counsel prevented 
4 any discovery from occurring until mid-September to October 
5 time frame. 
6 The discovery that has occurred since that time has 
7 been minimal, and in fact there has been responses which — to 
8 [ request for admissions that were served in early October on the 
9 plaintiff, which do not resolve any issues. There have been 
10 objections to request to produce. 
11 Out of a total of 33 requests to produce, the 
12 plaintiff objected to and produced nothing in 26 of those 
13 requests. That's significant, not because I think there may 
14 not be some basis for objection in one or two of those, but 
15 there is certainly not a basis for objection in 90-plus percent 
16 of the request to produce. 
17 He did -- the plaintiff's Counsel did defer response 
18 in two requests, and he set out a minimal amount of information 
19 in additional three requests. Those additional three requests 
2 0 relate to the sales file in regard to this case. 
21 The reason that sales file is important is because 
22 of the affidavit, again, of Ryan Farnsworth, because the 
23 information produced doesn't correspond with anything in 
24 Mr. Farnsworth's affidavit. 
25 THE COURT: Can I — 
-18-
1 MR. WHITMER: We have a right to inquire into that. 
2 THE COURT: Can I ask you this. Because the motion 
3 for summary judgment turns on interpretation of the contractual 
4 language in the statute, could I reach those issues, as opposed 
5 to the marketing tactics of the insurance company that may go 
6 to bad faith, but could I interpret the contract as a matter 
7 of law and the statute as a matter of law? 
8 MR. WHITMER: Well, I don't think you could interpret 
9 it absent the factual basis of how the contract was entered 
10 into and what the terms of the contract were. I think those 
11 are factual issues, not purely issues of law, as plaintiff's 
12 Counsel has presented them. Certainly there are many issues of 
13 law associated with it, but those are not the only things there 
14 is issues of law. 
15 THE COURT: But what facts would be pertinent to the 
16 issue of whether the household exclusion is permitted under 
17 Utah law? 
18 MR. WHITMER: The facts that would be pertinent would 
19 be whether or not Liberty Mutual provided a policy through 
2 0 Ryan Farnsworth that provided the same coverage as in the Met 
21 Life policy, as was the representation as indicated in Burdene 
22 Shores' affidavit. 
23 THE COURT: Is it your position that your clients 
24 didn't receive a copy of the policy? 
25 MR. WHITMER: No, we — your Honor, we did receive — 
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1 my clients did receive a copy of the policy sometime after it 
2 was issued. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. WHITMER: After the terms were negotiated. 
5 THE COURT: So this isn't a State Farm vs. Call 
6 problem? 
7 MR. WHITMER: Not exactly. No, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: So there's no issue about whether they 
9 received a copy of the policy that contained the exclusions — 
10 the purchaser did? 
11 MR. WHITMER: They did receive a copy of the policy 
12 significantly after the policy was issued and after the terms 
13 had -- the terms had been discussed. 
14 Proceeding on in this motion, I would argue to the 
15 Court that the reply brief in this case by plaintiff's Counsel 
16 is in reality a new motion. The initial motion for summary 
17 judgment filed in September applied primarily Nasbaum. Said it 
18 was the leading case in this area. 
19 The defense — at least Burdene Shores still believes 
20 it's the leading case in this area; but the best that can 
21 be said in favor of the plaintiff in Nasbaum is that it is 
22 inconclusive. At worst, the opinion of the dissent, and 
23 Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart would hold that the 
24 policy of insurance in this case is not valid as to the family 
25 exclusion. 
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1 Plaintiff's Counsel spends a significant amount of 
2 time in his reply brief; 17 — physically 19 pages — 
3 THE COURT: Can I just add — before you leave Nasbaum, 
4 what do you think the holding in this case is? 
5 MR. WHITMER: I believe the holding is that a post-1986 
6 family exclusion is not permitted. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. WHITMER: As I was starting to say in the 17 to 19 
9 page memoranda that plaintiff's Counsel has filed in reply, 
10 this is really a new motion for summary judgment, which in 
11 fairness, in addition to the discovery issues, the defense 
12 should have the opportunity to respond to. 
13 This isn't a five-page reply addressing simply the 
14 issues that were raised in the opposition. Although some of 
15 those issues are addressed, it's not within the bounds of a 
16 normal reply memorandum. 
17 So I would therefore at a minimum request the 
18 opportunity to respond to that reply memorandum, both with 
19 additional discovery, and with arguments and case law. 
20 THE COURT: Can you — I read the reply memorandum 
21 earlier today. What specific — actually, read the reply 
22 memorandumlate last night, and read your memorandum earlier 
23 today. What specific new issues do you need — do you feel 
24 like you need to respond to? 
25 MR. WHITMER: Well, the primary new issues relate to — 
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1 factual new issues relate to statements by Ryan Farnsworth in 
2 his affidavit, of which we were totally unaware until the reply 
3 memorandum. 
4 Second thing relates to — excuse me a moment. The 
5 fact again here, the plaintiff's Counsel has argued extensively 
6 cases not in Utah jurisdiction. As he candidly admitted in his 
7 opening argument, there are no cases directly in point beyond 
8 Nasbaum in Utah. That makes Nasbaum, at least in my mind, the, 
9 if not totally controlling, highly persuasive case law, that 
10 post 1986 family exclusions are invalid. 
11 Now, additionally plaintiff's Counsel has made 
12 extensive arguments in regard to ambiguity, going far beyond 
13 any of the simple arguments in the initial motion for summary 
14 judgment. 
15 I believe we need to have time to explore those issues 
16 in greater detail to supply a response to this reply, so that 
17 the issues may be appropriately presented to the Court, but 
18 primarily factual issues, and also so that discovery may be 
19 pressed forward. 
2 0 At this point in time, virtually no substantive 
21 discovery has occurred. Not because we haven't tried to 
22 perform some substantive discovery, but because the plaintiff's 
23 Counsel has, in my opinion, actively obstructed substantive 
24 discovery ever since the case has been filed. We would — 
25 THE COURT: I don't know the answer to this question. 
-22-
1 You can help me. Is there a pretrial scheduling order? Have 
2 you hold your attorney planning meeting and —• 
3 MR. WHITMER: An attorney planning meeting was held in 
4 mid September, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Is there a scheduling order that 
6 arose out of that? 
7 MR. WHITMER: I believe there was. 
8 THE COURT: What are the deadlines for fact discovery? 
9 I just had them. 
10 MR. WHITMER: Judge, I don't have it with me. I 
11 believe that we have — 
12 MR. ADY: Peter — 
13 MR. WHITMER: — next summer (inaudible). 
14 MR. ADY: It's just a — check the last page, Peter. 
15 THE COURT: I just didn't get a chance to look, 
16 frankly. 
17 MR. WHITMER: Here is Mr. Ady's file copy. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you for that. I should have looked 
19 further. 
2 0 MR. WHITMER: Your Honor, in brief conclusion of my 
21 argument, the substantive issues in the motion for summary 
22 judgment are in great dispute. Plaintiff's primary arguments 
23 involve, again, non-Utah cases. Most notably Pribble v. State 
24 Farm from Wyoming. The statutory and case law in Wyoming don't 
25 sup — don't follow Utah statutory or case law at all, at least 
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1 as far as I was able to determine. So I don't think it's 
2 really in point, the Pribble case. 
3 Another important factor that's been argued is the 
4 statutes of Utah related to requirements for rates being 
5 separately stated for different rating factors. I believe 
6 that's code subsection 308 requires those things to be stated 
7 separately. 
8 There are — or is not real separate statement of 
9 limits of liability, which as you correctly pointed out, is an 
10 exclusionary limit of liability as it relates to the plaintiff, 
11 Burdene Shores, in this case. Excludes her liability from 
12 anything over $25,000 regardless of what the declarations page 
13 says. 
14 There is no indication on the declarations page that 
15 the $25,000 limit applies to Burdene Shores. I think it's 
16 important to comply with the statute that it be stated on the 
17 declarations page. It is not. 
18 There is a significant section in the policy of 
19 insurance that talks about rating factors. There is no mention 
2 0 of a rating factor as being a co-insured or a family household 
21 member or anything of that nature as a rating factor. 
22 So while the policy terms the $25,000 a limit, an 
23 exclusionary limit of liability, it is both ambiguous in what 
24 it means, because of arguments put forth in the brief. 
25 Common ordinary person, let alone a person of 71, 
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1 75, 82 years old, could be easily confused by obtuse language 
2 referring to statutes, calling things "minimum limits," when in 
3 reality they're maximum limits. 
4 An ordinary person would be confused by the policy if 
5 they weren't schooled in the law. If an ordinary person of 30 
6 to 50 would be confused, certainly a person of 71 — currently 
7 75 to 83 would be confused. 
8 These are, again, factual issues that need to be 
9 explored as to — if we could go into marketing practices, 
10 again, these are things that plaintiff's Counsel has failed 
11 to provide discovery on to this point, and which we intend to 
12 actively pursue in obtaining the information as to how Liberty 
13 Mutual marketed to seniors, and especially to retired people, 
14 who by common ordinary knowledge have limited understanding of 
15 legal matters, someone especially not schooled in the law. 
16 For those reasons I believe the policy is both 
17 ambiguous -- it's a violation of statute, and there are 
18 material factual disputes which preclude summary judgment in 
19 this case. Certainly at a minimum require additional discovery 
2 0 to be completed before we can say with any authoritativeness 
21 what the state of the facts is. Thank you, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Tell me what it is you'd like 
2 3 me to do, and in what order, I guess? What priority? Do you 
24 want the Rule 56(f)? 
25 MR. WHITMER: Yes, I would like the Rule — 
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1 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
2 MR. WHITMER: — the Rule 56. That will be one of 
3 the first items. I will anticipate filing the motion at the 
4 earliest, the beginning of next — at the latest, the beginning 
5 of next week. Certainly I would like the Rule 56(f) motion 
6 almost immediately. 
7 The same time that motion is filed there will be 
8 a motion to compel discovery, in regard to the many, many 
9 requests to produce that the plaintiff has refused and 
10 objected to answering; and also to be able to inquire into 
11 the competence and truthfulness of Mr. Farnsworth, as in our 
12 mind it's a significant piece of the picture; which we haven't 
13 had time to, having received his affidavit only Monday of this 
14 week. 
15 Beyond that, you know, the limits set forth in the 
16 scheduling order are probably adequate to give us time to do 
17 these things if it's pressed vigorously. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
19 MR. WHITMER: Thank you. 
2 0 THE COURT: Mr. Ady, let me just inquire, is your 
21 motion a motion for summary judgment? 
22 MR. ADY: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: That's not before me today, then, right? 
24 MR. ADY: Yeah, yeah. No, and I intend to only argue, 
25 if I can put it this way, to ski a tight line, based upon 
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1 I supplementing those — some arguments off of Mr. Whitmer's 
2 memorandum in opposition. 
3 THE COURT: So are you just joining in his memorandum? 
4 MR. ADY: Yeah, I want to make argument on his — yes, 
5 I'm joining in his memorandum, and wish to make argument off of 
6 it, if I may. 
7 I THE COURT: I'm going to — that's fine. I hear you 
joining in the motion of — that they've made; but your motion 
9 I for summary judgment that's been filed today isn't ready for 
10 decision. I'm not going to rule on that. 
11 MR. ADY: Right. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
13 MR. ADY: Sir, I think Mr. Whitmer's laid out — and 
14 Mr. Rice have both done a very good job of laying out the 
15 issues here. I don't want to trench on Mr. Whitmer's arguments 
16 at all. So if I start to, please let me know. 
17 I want to talk just a little about the ambiguity 
18 issue. The case cited by Mr. Whitmer in his memorandum, 
19 Versaw, I think is a very important case. Why I think Versaw 
2 0 is so important is because I think it distinguishes Utah law 
21 from Pribble, the Wyoming case. 
22 In Utah, once a Court finds ambiguity, then it applies 
23 rules of construction to resolve that ambiguity. I don't 
24 believe that's the case in Utah. I think that our Courts 
25 up front apply the test in Pribble, and that page 10 of 
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1 Mr. Whitmer's brief at paragraph 8, it is -- or they cite 
2 paragraph 8 of Versaw. 
3 I'll quote it, "Would the meaning of the language 
4 of the insurance contract be plain to a person of ordinary 
5 intelligence, understanding, viewing the matter fairly and 
6 reasonably in accordance with the usual and natural meaning 
7 of the words and the light — and in the light of existing 
8 circumstances?" I think --
9 THE COURT: Can you give me a cite on that? 
10 MR. ADY: It is 2004 of Utah 73, and I just quoted from 
11 paragraph 8. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, and that's — 
13 MR. ADY: 2000. 
14 THE COURT: •— out of the Court of Appeals or — 
15 MR. ADY: Utah. That's the Utah Supreme Court. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. ADY: And I think "in the light of existing 
18 circumstances" is a term that I would like to focus on. If 
19 one looks at this policy, and it's attached as Exhibit A to 
2 0 Mr. Rice's memorandum, there is in there — I think it's 
21 perhaps the very last page -- or near the very last — yes. 
22 In my copy it's the very last page of that memorandum of 
23 Mr. Rice, under tab A. This is his memorandum support of the 
24 motion for summary judgment. 
25 Mrs. Shores was required to sign this summary page, 
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1 and on this summary page it's quite interesting. She's 
2 required to sign this, and right at the very top, Liberty 
3 Mutual puts in this language: 
4 "Please be aware that any summary of coverage on 
5 this form is necessarily general in nature." Okay, so we've 
6 outlined her coverage here as "general in nature." 
7 Then the next two sentences are what I want to key 
8 on. "Her policy contains "specific descriptions, definitions, 
9 exclusions and conditions." 
10 Your policy, "In case of any conflict — " "any 
11 conflict." It's unequivocal — "your policy language will 
12 control the resolution of coverage questions." So they make 
13 her sign off on this statement. 
14 "If you have any questions, please contact your local 
15 Liberty Mutual sales office before completing this form." So 
16 what Liberty Mutual is telling Mrs. Shores with this form right 
17 there is "Talk to your sales representative, Mr. Farnsworth. 
18 He'll help you understand this policy." 
19 What did Mr. Farnsworth do? Told her it provided the 
20 same coverage -- now, this is a fact that's in dispute -- as 
21 her old policy, and this — they had her sign off on this. 
22 Furthermore, what's interesting about the second 
23 sentence in that first paragraph, sir — 
24 THE COURT: Did it? 
25 MR. ADY: Pardon me? 
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1 THE COURT: Did it provide the same coverage as — 
2 MR. ADY: No, the step-down clause clearly diminishes 
3 coverage. So they give her this and they tell her, "Talk to 
4 our sales rep. He's going to help you understand this form," 
5 or what his help was, "It's the same coverage." 
6 Now, "Your policy contains specific descriptions, 
7 definitions, exclusions and conditions," second sentence in 
8 that first paragraph. Not one word in there about endorsements, 
9 not one. That's why Versaw quotes Sant, I think. I saw it in 
10 Mr. Whitmer's brief, and he maybe can give me a leg up here if 
11 I stumble. 
12 The concept that if you could readily include language 
13 in a policy at — to resolve an ambiguity or to clarify its 
14 terms, and you don't, "Well, we're sorry, Mr. Insure, you're 
15 going to take it in the shorts on coverage," because it's going 
16 to be construed against you. 
17 So where we're at here is the summary page sets out 
18 here and says, "Look at your policy. It controls over — it 
19 trumps everything else; and if you've got any questions about 
2 0 this exceedingly complex document, you talk to your sales rep 
21 before you sign this form," and she did. 
22 Now, I'd just like to take you through, and hit some 
23 of the highlights in this document. I think the observations 
24 of Counsel — I was in a mediation yesterday regarding an 
25 insurance policy up at the Court of Appeals. Counsel for the 
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1 insurance company said, "You know, I have to read these things 
2 14 or 15 times before I can understand them." That's a very 
3 experienced insurance Counsel, and Kirk, I think is — was very 
4 forthright in telling me that. 
5 If you look at page 11 of the policy, which is tab A, 
6 part F, section A to this policy — 
7 THE COURT: I'm sorry, my page numbers are cut off. So 
8 you're looking — give me a section or part. 
9 MR. ADY: Part F. 
10 THE COURT: Part F? 
11 MR. ADY: Part F. Mine are cut off, too. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. ADY: We go to part — looks like you're there. 
14 I'm still looking. That's the general provisions, your Honor. 
15 Oh, general provisions, there we are. Part F, and then I want 
16 to look at Section A. 
17 "This policy contains all of the ingredients between 
18 you and us. It's terms may not be changed or waived, except by 
19 endorsement issued by us." 
2 0 Now, I'd invite the Court to read this policy. I 
21 have, and Mr. Rice can correct me if I misstate this, but I 
22 couldn't find anywhere else in this policy where it talked 
23 about endorsements. Not one other place. That's it, and it 
24 says the endorsements have to be issued. 
25 If you look at the last page of this policy — two 
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1 more pages in — when I think of "issued," I think is someone 
2 signing off and saying, you know, authoritatively, "Here it 
3 goes." Well, you've got the secretary and the president of 
4 Liberty Mutual issuing this policy. There's their signatures 
5 at the bottom of that page. 
6 If you look at the endorsements that are attached, 
7 how one would determine whether those are issued, I don't know, 
8 because they're all just forms. There's nothing to indicate 
9 that these are issued. 
10 In fact, it just has ISO Properties, Inc. 2001. 
11 I forget what ISO means, but it's an insurance service 
12 organization. Do you know what that means, Mr. Rice? ISO. 
13 Insurance Service Organization, I think it means. They provide 
14 forms to insurance companies. 
15 So what we've got here are a bunch of ISO forms 
16 attached in, with no indication that they've ever been issued. 
17 In fact, on my —- on my copy, if you page in — if you were 
18 a lay reader, a person of ordinary intelligence — and I 
19 know you're not, your Honor — but if you were, the first 
20 endorsement you would hit — 
21 THE COURT: I'm working to become that way. 
22 MR. ADY: —• the second endorsement — 
23 THE COURT: I'm working to become a person of ordinary 
24 intelligence. 
25 MR. ADY: Okay. 
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1 THE COURT: I hope to achieve that, and I mean that. 
2 MR. ADY: I'm sorry, I was talking from the other 
3 direction. 
4 THE COURT: I know. It's all right. 
5 MR. ADY: But if you look at the first endorsement, 
6 nothing's checked. Nothing's filled in. Schedule, here's an 
7 endorsement attached. You don't see any marks — at least on 
8 the one that Mr. Rice has attached. You don't see any check 
9 marks. 
10 You go to the next endorsement. That's five, six 
11 pages in. Under "Insured motorist coverage Utah, schedule, 
12 limited liability," nothing's filled in. 
13 Now, this continues on — or those two, at least. So 
14 how do you know that they've been issued? Oh, then you go 
15 "Towing and labor cost coverage," which is a number of pages 
16 in. Once again, it's all blank. 
17 You can go to "Property damage," "Uninsured motorist 
18 coverage." All the schedules are blank. So the only reference 
19 in this entire policy is to endorsements, says that they have 
2 0 to be issued. You look at them, and one is going to ask right 
21 away, as a lay person of ordinary intelligence, "Well, are 
22 these issued?" "What are these?" 
23 There's no signature. There's no stamp on there 
24 saying, "Issued by Liberty Mutual." Most policies, sir, that 
25 I've encountered, contain a statement at the bottom. Right 
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1 under that signature line on the last page where you've got 
2 Dexter R. Long and Edmund F. Kelly, there's a big in black 
3 letters — block letters, "The endorsements attached hereto 
4 form a part of — " and if you read, "as part of this policy," 
5 or some language like that. Don't see that there. 
6 So what you have is a summary page that I referred you 
7 to earlier that says, "The policy trumps everything else," and 
8 it talks about policy descriptions, definitions, exclusions and 
9 conditions, and doesn't say one word about endorsements. 
10 The policy goes through, if you read sir, and talks 
11 -- never talks about declarations generally, or makes any kind 
12 of provision for declarations. Always refers to them bit by 
13 bit on an ad hoc basis. 
14 I'd like to refer the Court to a statute, 31(a)-21-
15 1061 Utah Code says that "Any insurance policy form containing 
16 any agreement or incorporation of any provision not fully set 
17 forth in the policy or other document attached to and made 
18 a part of the policy isn't part of the policy. Fully set 
19 forth and attached and made part of the policy." Well, this 
2 0 is certainly in my view isn't fully set forth, and made part 
21 of the policy, these endorsements. 
22 Then at Versaw — at Versaw again, at paragraph 25, 
23 the Supreme Court says, "We've also stated that ambiguous or 
24 uncertain language in an insurance contract that is very 
25 susceptible to different interpretations should be construed 
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1 in favor of coverage. Insurance contract has inconsistent 
2 provisions; one which can be construed against coverage and 
3 one which can be construed in favor of coverage, the contract 
4 should be construed in favor of coverage." 
5 Well, other ambiguities. Define this — 
6 THE COURT: Let me ask you this. How is the endorsement 
7 itself — what is your fairly susceptible interpretation in 
8 subsection (b) in the endorsement issue, the language, "We do 
9 not provide liability coverage for any insured." 
10 MR. ADY: Let me get to that, sir, if I may. 
11 THE COURT: It's — I'm sorry — "Amendment of policy 
12 provisions, Utah — " 
13 MR. ADY: I just looked at it before coming to Court. 
14 THE COURT: I think the issue that would be before me 
15 is are there two reasonable interpretations of the endorsement 
16 itself, and --
17 MR. ADY: Ah. 
18 THE COURT: — and I wonder what those might be, as far 
19 as you're concerned. 
20 MR. ADY: I think there's more than one reasonable 
21 interpretation. I'd like to go through those and expanding on 
22 Mr. Whitmer' s brief — memorandum. 
23 First of all, look at the forerunning of this, sir. 
24 You've got part one, Roman Numeral I, part A. So Roman Numeral 
25 I, part A, liability coverage. That's what part A addresses. 
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1 Then you've got three subs, three subparts; (a), (b), (c). 
2 Okay? Now, notice that sub — and then you go over and you've 
3 got under subpart (c)(1) and (2) for other insurance -- (1), 
4 (2) and (3). 
5 Then you've got a part II, Roman Numeral II, part (c), 
6 uninsured motorist coverage. I don't know what happened to 
7 part (b). I don't think it's of any real consequence, other 
8 than it's going to cause more questions in the mind of a lay 
9 person. 
10 THE COURT: It just wasn't amended, I suppose. It is 
11 what it is in the policy. 
12 MR. ADY: Yeah, and a lay person, I guess, would have 
13 to sit and stew on that for quite some time, but here's the 
14 thing. Under part A, liability coverage, a lay person looks 
15 at this, and I don't think that Mrs. Shores concedes that she 
16 had to have read the endorsement. 
17 I think, for the sake of argument, I think as I 
18 understand her position is, you know, "You never issued these 
19 endorsements. You never filled in the schedules. You gave me 
2 0 the summary page, saying that I didn't need to look at these, 
21 and told me to talk to the agent, which I did, and he told me I 
22 had coverage." 
23 So I think the endorsements, you don't even have to 
24 look at; but if you do, for the sake of argument, then I think 
25 you get the issues like this. Part 1(a) purports to replace 
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1 the paragraph A of the insuring agreement, and if you soldier 
2 and slug on through this verbiage, you get to part 1(b), and it 
3 says, "The limits of liability for this coverage." 
4 Now, you've just gotten rid of part A — or paragraph 
5 A, with part A. Part B talks about third line down in that 
6 paragraph, that "The limits of liability for this coverage 
7 exceed." That line. Can you see that, sir? 
8 THE COURT: I do, yeah. 
9 MR. ADY: "The limits of liability for this coverage 
10 exceed." Well, where do I find that at? Well, I don't go 
11 look at paragraph A, because it's gone now. Part A covers 
12 that. Hm, where would I go for that? I'm a lay reader. 
13 Go down to the Provo Library and pour over the Utah 
14 code, and you will eventually conclude that the only limits you 
15 can find are those stated in 31 (a)-22-304. There they are. 
16 Stated rights, and they're repeated verbatim in the policy; and 
17 they're stated as the minimum limits. Well, what does 
18 that mean? Because they're repeatedly stated to be minimum, 
19 not maximum limits. 
2 0 Then you look at this again, and you wonder "To the 
21 extent that the limits of liability of this coverage exceed," 
22 what does that mean, then? Your agent's already told you that 
23 you've got coverage, because the policy told us to rely upon 
24 it, and so you're looking at it that way. 
25 Now, is this a reference to the Utah code? I mean, 
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1 that's a reasonable conclusion. If it is, I would con — the 
2 lay reader would conclude it doesn't affect your coverage under 
3 the policy, given that the minimum coverage stated in the last 
4 sentence of subpart 1(a) adopts the language in the Utah code. 
5 Part 1(b), pardon me, adopts the language in the Utah code. 
6 Is that line, "The limits of liability for this 
7 coverage exceed," is it a reference to the old policy term 
8 now replaced by subpart 1(a), and in that case, because the 
9 old paragraph A of the insurance agreement no longer applies, 
10 mustn't the lay reader conclude that this coverage refers to 
11 the old paragraph A, so that the lay reader does have excess 
12 coverage under the endorsement. 
13 You're sitting there and you're going, "Well, if that 
14 refers to the old paragraph A — " it doesn't say what it refers 
15 to. It's an ambiguous reference. If it does refer to the old 
16 paragraph A, we've got a new subpart (a), and therefore I 
17 guess I've got coverage, because it doesn't apply. 
18 Or is it a reference to the subpart 1(a) of this 
19 endorsement, meaning that so long as the limits stated in the 
20 declaration exceed those in this endorsement, this endorsement 
21 does not apply? Because they keep talking about minimum 
22 limits. 
23 Or is it a limited reference to other insurance? 
24 Because you've got subpart (c) under part A, "Other insurance," 
25 and is that what this is all leading down to, because you go 
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1 from (a) to (b) to (c). So what it's saying is if we have 
2 other insurance, then these —- we can't exceed these minimum 
3 limits for liability, because you've got in big bold letters 
4 other insurance there. 
5 The fact that they put other insurance under that 
6 liability coverage, and then over at part II, which is a full 
7 heading part II, Roman Numeral II, uninsured motorist coverage, 
8 just reinforces that belief that all they're really talking 
9 about here is if I've got other insurance, then, darn it, I'm 
10 limited, as that line says, to this kind of liability coverage. 
11 So there's a number of alternative readings because 
12 of that ambiguous reference in subpart (b) to this endorsement. 
13 So in summary, sir, our position — I would say in support of 
14 Mr. Whitmer's argument, first of all, Liberty gave her the 
15 summary page. They told her, "Don't look at the endorsements. 
16 Look at this. That controls. That trumps everything else. 
17 If you have questions talk to your agent." 
18 She talked to Farnsworth. He told her she had the 
19 same coverage, and that's the interpretation they told her to 
2 0 use, and that's the one she used, and I think they created the 
21 ambiguity. They're bound under Versaw and cases supporting it. 
22 Even if you get to the endorsement, as I've pointed 
23 out, there's a number of ambiguities because of that ambiguous 
24 reference of that one line. What is it talking about? One 
25 could very easily conclude that they're only talking about 
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1 other insurance, because they include it in the same subpart, 
2 and I gave you some other arguments that I won't repeat. Those 
3 are my suggestions, sir. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ady. 
5 MR. RICE: Your Honor, may I respond? 
6 THE COURT: You may. 
7 MR. RICE: Okay. Judge, I can only refer you to the 
8 case law, and comparing some of those provisions that have 
9 been upheld to this provision. This is actually much more 
10 clear than provisions that have been upheld in the case law. 
11 This says under B, "The following exclusion is added." 
12 How much more plain could that be? "We do not provide liability 
13 coverage for any insured for bodily injury." That's fairly 
14 straightforward, pretty plain. 
15 Again, I'll refer you to the case law where they've 
16 upheld household exclusions. They have language similar to 
17 that, or a variant of that. The Courts have said, "Yes, that's 
18 okay. That passes the test." 
19 Liberty did something a little bit extra. As you look 
2 0 at the case law, you'll see that many of those provisions that 
21 were upheld didn't include the information about the minimum 
22 limits. 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
24 MR. RICE: Some of them said — some of them just said, 
25 "To the extent they don't exceed the applicable minimum 
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1 limits," but then they didn't go the next step and put in what 
2 those limits are. Liberty took the time to do that. That even 
3 makes it more plain and straightforward. 
4 It's referring again to the Utah code, so the reader 
5 knows where to go. They feel like they get —• if they have to 
6 get somebody involved, at least they know where to go to look 
7 that up. 
8 I just don't know how you could come up with any 
9 multiple meanings, omission of terms, any unclarity with a 
10 statement that says, "We do not provide liability coverage for 
11 any insured for bodily injury." 
12 THE COURT: Are I and II quoted directly out of the 
13 statute? 
14 MR. RICE: I don't believe that they're direct, but 
15 they're similar. Now, to the argument that — this endorsement 
16 argument. The defendants have done a good job of clouding this 
17 issue, and making it into something it's not. The endorsement 
18 was provided. It was in the policy. The first page, the cover 
19 letter says, "Please read your policy and each endorsement 
20 carefully." 
21 Under the agreement, the first sentence, "In return 
22 for payment of the premium, and subject to all terms of the 
23 policy, we agree with you as follows." 
24 Not only that, but the declarations actually did refer 
25 to the endorsements, numbered them. There's a reference to 
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1 that. Nowf it doesn't lay it outr but it refers to the 
2 endorsements. Again, now — 
3 THE COURT: Is it undisputed that the policy as it 
4 exists in Exhibit A to your memorandum is the policy that was 
5 provided to — 
6 MR. RICE: Undisputed from our angle. 
7 THE COURT: I don't — I really need to know that, I 
8 think, before — 
9 MR. WHITMER: Your Honor — 
10 THE COURT: Is this what she got? 
11 MR. WHITMER: The substantive terms are the same. 
12 However, there was much other information included in the 
13 policy as delivered to the Shores — as delivered to Burdene 
14 Shores. That's included on the answer, I believe. 
15 MR. RICE: Your Honor, it seems to me if that's an 
16 issue, where is it? If that's an issue in this case, where is 
17 it in a memorandum in opposition? You know — 
18 THE COURT: I'm just inquiring of the limits. 
19 MR. RICE: Okay, all right. I lose a little bit of 
2 0 patience when I talk about things that aren't before the Court, 
21 when today's the day to decide this issue. 
22 Again, I'll refer to the opinions that I've cited to. 
23 It doesn't matter if it's a provisions and an endorsement. 
24 It's still a valid provision. Policies are to be read as a 
25 whole. They're to be considered as a whole. That's what the 
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1 Judges have found. 
2 Moving onto the discovery issue. Judge, I think 
3 if you're going to file a Rule 56(f) motion on a motion for 
4 summary judgment, it has to be before the Court. It has to be 
5 with a memorandum in opposition, with an affidavit and properly 
6 done. 
7 This is the first I've heard of a Rule 56(f) motion. 
8 Now, I feel a little bit like I'm being railroaded here and 
9 slandered on discovery. We've responded to the discovery, and 
10 we have asserted some valid objections. Mr. Whitmer served a 
11 whole lot of request for production and request for admissions. 
12 A lot of them are immaterial to the case. So we've asserted 
13 some valid objections. 
14 Your Honor, we're here today because we feel that this 
15 issue is ripe and ready. I agree with your prior statement. 
16 This is a question of law. This is a legal issue. 
17 Now, the only issue that could arguably be factual is 
18 did Mr. Farnsworth fail to disclose the household exclusion, or 
19 did he misrepresent it in some way? I've talked about that at 
2 0 length in the reply memorandum, but let me just emphasize a few 
21 I things. 
22 First of all, we will admit that he didn't talk about 
23 the household exclusion. He didn't talk about any of the other 
24 exclusions either. It's not common practice to do so. You 
25 don't do that at that point. You don't go through and go 
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1 through every limitation and exclusion. 
2 The insured is provided with the policy, and the first 
3 page reads, "Please read your policy and each endorsement 
4 carefully." Did Liberty Mutual get a call in the next nine 
5 months before the accident? No. Did Mr. Farnsworth? No. 
6 There were no questions. There was nothing that was brought 
7 up. The policy was provided. 
8 Now, that's part of the argument. The second part 
9 that completely undercuts and undermines this argument about 
10 misrepresentation is that the Met Life policy had a household 
11 exclusion. It had one in there. So not only do you have the 
12 100/300 coverage, but you've also got a household exclusion in 
13 the Met Life policy. 
14 So let's assume for a minute Mr. Farnsworth did say 
15 the coverage is the same. You know what? That's an accurate 
16 representation, right down to the household exclusion, because 
17 it's in there, in the Met Life policy. 
18 Now, Mr. Whitmer argues that that exclusion is not 
19 valid. Well, that's the same argument we're here talking 
2 0 about today. You know, if this one isn't valid, that one's 
21 not valid. If that one's valid, this one's valid. 
22 THE COURT: And can you just help me. This is a 
23 declaratory judgment action brought by your client to determine 
24 what this means, right? 
25 MR. RICE: Correct. 
-44-
THE COURT: And the counterclaim for bad faith was 
dismissed on motion for summary judgment. 
MR. RICE: Only Burdene's. 
THE COURT: Only Burdene's? 
MR. RICE: Mr. Adyfs client still has one pending. 
THE COURT: Okay. So if I were to rule in your favor 
today, what would be left? Yourve brought the dec action. Is 
all that's left the counterclaim for bad faith? 
MR. RICE: That is correct. Your Honor, I did things 
surgically, and there's a rhyme and a reason for that. First 
of all, based on the Court's ruling in July, I felt that 
Burdene did not have standing to bring a bad faith claim. So 
I immediately brought that motion. 
Then I brought this motion because I felt like it is a 
legal issue that can be decided without any discovery. Then my 
feeling is that depending on how the Court decides this issue 
•— that issue, that has a bearing on Mr. Shores' counterclaim 
for bad faith. So yes — 
THE COURT: As to whether there was a material breach, 
right? Bad faith requires a material breach in the contract, 
and if I were to rule in your favor then there is none? 
MR. RICE: Correct. That's — your Honor, that's why I 
approached it like I did. Judge, I believe that discovery is 
not necessary. The issues are here. They're before the Court. 
Discovery is also only going to create more expense. I will 
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1 flatly admit that there is a dispute as to what Mr. Farnsworth 
2 said and what Mrs. Shore said. 
3 THE COURT: Can I disregard — 
4 MR. RICE: Immaterial. 
5 THE COURT: — everything in Mr. Farnsworth's affidavit 
6 and rule on this legal issue today? 
7 MR. RICE: I believe, your Honor, that you can. I 
8 provided that to give the Court some — a better understanding 
9 of the issues of the case, but I believe that you can accept 
10 what Burdene has said. Not the legal representations, not 
11 statements like "There was a misrepresentation." 
12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
13 MR. RICE: But the factual part, I think you can still 
14 rule on this, keeping in mind, Judge, that in the Met Life 
15 policy there was a household exclusion. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MR. RICE: Which I think completely destroys any 
18 argument or misrepresentation. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, and so other than that alleged 
2 0 misrepresentation, I can disregard everything Mr. Farnsworth 
21 says in his affidavit? 
22 MR. RICE: For purposes of this motion? 
23 THE COURT: Right. 
24 MR. RICE: Judge, I think that's correct, because the 
25 issue of whether the provision is valid, that's a legal issue. 
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1 THE COURT: And I guess that's what I'm getting to; is 
2 if what you're doing is presenting to me the legal issue of 
3 are household exclusions in excess of minimum limits lawful 
4 in Utah, that's requiring me to interpret Call and Nasbaum and 
5 Calhoun — 
6 MR. RICE: Correct. 
7 THE COURT: — and the statute, and simply rule on that 
8 legal question. 
9 MR. RICE: Correct. Correct, and I would add to that 
10 that if the Court is considering any factual issue about the 
11 misrepresentation, there is no issue there. There's no 
12 material issue, because there's no misrepresentation. 
13 THE COURT: Could I — I can't remember. Did you 
14 provide me the Met Life policy, or all the — 
15 MR. RICE: The opposing attorney did. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. I can't remember. 
17 MR. WHITMER: It's attached to Burdene Shores' 
18 affidavit, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: That's right. Okay. 
2 0 MR. RICE: I don't think discovery is going to further 
21 — I don't think it's going to advance anything with regard to 
22 the material issues. 
23 THE COURT: Oh, there it is. Okay. 
24 MR. RICE: Judge, I believe that exclusion's on page 4 
25 of 24. 
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1 my notes and look one more time at a couple of cases. 
2 If I can rule from the bench, I'll come out and do it 
3 in about 15 minutes. If having done that, I feel like I need 
4 more time — and I also want to think about the 56(f) issue — 
5 then I'll come out and do that, too, but if you can give me 
6 about 15 minutes, we'll be in recess. 
7 (Recess taken) 
8 THE COURT: Okay. We'll go back on the record in the 
9 matter of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company vs. Burdene Shores 
10 and Unior Shores. The record should reflect that Counsel for 
11 the parties are present. 
12 This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's 
13 motion for summary judgment as to its declaratory judgment 
14 action. Specifically the issue presented to the Court is 
15 whether parties to an insurance contract may limit motor 
16 vehicle liability coverage for household members of the 
17 insured in excess of minimum required limits under State law. 
18 The defendants in this matter have made a Rule 56(f) 
19 motion today. That rule provides that should it appear from 
2 0 the affidavit of a party opposing the motion, that he cannot, 
21 for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential to 
22 justify his opposition, the Court may refuse the application 
23 for judgment, or may order a continuance to permit affidavits 
24 to be obtained, or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
25 had; or make such other order as is just. 
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1 The basis for the Rule 56(f) motion primarily arises 
2 out of the filing of an affidavit in conjunction with the 
3 plaintiff's reply brief. It's the affidavit of Ryan Farnsworth. 
4 For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the Court 
5 disregards in its entirety the affidavit of Mr. Farnsworth, and 
6 can reach the issue of law presented; and therefore denies the 
7 Rule 56(f) motion for summary judgment, noting that pursuant 
8 to Rule 56(a), a party seeking to recover upon a claim for 
9 declaratory judgment; namely for summary judgment at any time 
10 after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the 
11 action. 
12 In reaching the issue presented, the Court construes 
13 the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
14 Insurance contracts are not subject to a negotiation between 
15 the parties. Therefore the insurance contract is construed in 
16 favor of the coverage and in favor of the insured, with respect 
17 to any ambiguities in that contract. Exceptions and limitations 
18 on coverage are permissible in an insurance contract unless 
19 they violate statute or public policy. 
2 0 Turning to the issues at hand, the Court makes the 
21 following findings of fact. That on September 9th, 2003, 
22 Burdene Shores was involved in an automobile accident, in 
23 which she was a passenger and her husband Unior Shores was 
24 driving. 
25 The automobile driven by Mr. Shores was insured under 
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1 a personal automobile policy issued by Liberty Mutual, with 
2 coverage from January 12th, 2003 to January 12th, 2004. 
3 The Liberty Mutual policy provides bodily injury 
4 liability coverage of $100,000 for each person, and $300,000 
5 per accident. With respect to liability coverage, the Liberty 
6 policy also includes a step-down or household exclusion, giving 
7 an endorsement to the policy. 
8 The provision states, "We do not provide liability 
9 coverage for any insurer for bodily injury to you to the 
10 extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed 
11 the applicable minimum limits for liability specified by Utah 
12 Code Annotated, Section 31(a)-32-304 . " 
13 Policy then states what those minimum limits are. 
14 Specifically, $65,000 for each accident, if the limit of 
15 liability for this coverage is a single limit that applies 
16 for each accident; or $25,000 for each person, $50,000 for 
17 each accident, if the limited liability for this coverage is 
18 indicated as a split limit. 
19 Through her Counsel for Ms. Shores has demanded that 
20 Liberty Mutual pay $100,000 under the policy as a result of the 
21 accident for her injuries. Ms. Shores has filed a separate 
22 lawsuit for negligent driving against Mr. Shores, in an attempt 
23 to collect under the liability coverage of the Liberty Mutual 
24 policy. 
25 Liberty Mutual has denied the defendant's demand based 
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1 on the household exclusion, leaving that coverage is limited to 
2 $25,000. Liberty Mutual now, by way of summary judgment, seeks 
3 declaratory judgment as to that issue. 
4 To determine this issue, the Court is required to look 
5 at case law beginning in 1985, and continuing through the year 
6 2004. In 1985 in the case of Farmer's Insurance Exchange vs. 
7 Call, the Utah Supreme Court held that household or family 
8 exclusion clauses in an automobile policy are contrary to 
9 public policy and statutory requirements of the No Fault 
10 Insurance Act, as to the minimum benefits provided by statute. 
11 The plaintiff in that case, the insured, argued that 
12 the household exclusion clause in the policy — I'm sorry. The 
13 insured, the defendant in the case, called the insured, argued 
14 that the household clause in the automobile policy was invalid 
15 as to the policy limits in excess of the statutory amounts. 
16 The Court declined to reach that question, and it is in effect 
17 presented to this Court today. 
18 The next case was approximately two years later. That 
19 is the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
20 vs. Nasbaum. In that case the Court held that a household or 
21 family exclusion in a polic — in an automobile policy issued 
22 prior to 1986 was valid and enforceable as to renounce in 
23 benefits provided by the automobile policy in excess of amounts 
24 which were statutorily mandated under the No Fault Insurance 
2 5 Act. 
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Justice Durham in that case wrote a dissenting opinion 
in which she argued that the statutory language in Section 
31(a)-22-309, and the legislative history of 31(a)-22-303 
precluded a household exception in all insurance policies, 
automobile policies, whether issued before 1986 or after 1986. 
Justice Zimmerman, who concurred in the late opinion, 
was persuaded by Justice Durham's opinion as it related to 
automobile insurance policies that issued after 1986; and 
Justice Stewart joined in that concurring opinion. 
In 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of 
I National Farmer's Union Property vs. Moore noted that the 
concurring opinion and dissenting opinion were in fact dicta, 
because that conclusion is not explained in that case, but the 
Court concludes that the reason for that is because the policy 
at issue in Nasbaum was issued before 1986. So the issue was 
never presented. 
Since Nasbaum there has been notable silence on this 
specific issue until the Supreme Court's holding this year in 
Calhoun vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
Now, that case — in that case the pol — automobile 
policy excluded from coverage the insured's son, because he 
had a — I believe a poor driving record. So the Court 
acknowledges that the policies — that the facts are not 
directly on point. 
Whether Calhoun sets forth a general rule of law for 
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1 the State of Utah, which this Court is banned by, Calhoun 
2 provides: 
3 "Contrary to the Calhoun's assertions, exclusionary 
4 endorsements such as the owned vehicle exception at issue are 
5 not necessarily invalid.7' 
6 The Calhoun case then quotes All State Insurance 
7 Company vs. United States Fiduciary and Guaranty Company, a 
8 1980 case, for this rule of law. Quote, "Rather, contracting 
9 parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the minimum 
10 required limits, and an exclusion found in a contract is valid 
11 in relation to any coverage exceeding minimum amounts." 
12 The Court finds that that rule of law is binding 
13 and on point and resolves the issue in this case; and grants 
14 summary judgment on that question to the plaintiff. 
15 Turning to the issue of clarity in the policy. "In 
16 order for the exclusion to be valid, it must be phrased in 
17 language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the 
18 insured the specific circumstances under which the expected 
19 coverage will not be provided." 
2 0 The plaintiffs — the plaintiff in this case contends 
21 that the language in the policy is — meets this standard. 
22 The defendants contend that the policy is confusing and fails 
23 to unmistakably communicate those circumstances under which 
24 coverage is limited. 
25 After reviewing the language, the Court notes that 
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1 it addresses complex issues. There's no question about that. 
2 However, it communicates those issues in a way that meets the 
3 required standard under Calhoun. 
4 I find that it clearly and unmistakably communicates 
5 to the insured the specific circumstances under which the 
6 expected coverage would not be provided to Burdene Shores. 
7 As to that issue I rule in favor of the plaintiff. 
8 The issue, thenf that remains in this case is 
9 Mr. Shores' bad faith claim. In the responsive memorandum 
10 the defendants bring a host of factual allegations with respect 
11 to misrepresentations that were made to induce the Shores to 
12 enter into the insurance contract; and also what Ms. Shores 
13 alleges to be unfair or fraudulent marketing tactics on the 
14 part of the insurance company. 
15 The Court finds that those issues go to the question 
16 of bad faith; and that issue is not before me today. For those 
17 reasons the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. 
18 Mr. Ricer will you prepare an order consistent with my 
19 decision? 
20 MR. RICE: I will, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, enjoy your weekend. 
22 Thank you for your patience tonight. 
23 MR. RICE: Thank you, sir. 
24 MR. WHITMER: Thank you for your time. 
25 (Hearing concluded) 
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